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WHAT LEVEL OF DECENTRALIZATION IS BETTER IN AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT? AN APPLICATION TO WATER RESOURCES IN SPAIN

-Introduction
The relation between the intergovernmental structure of a country and various environment outcomes is currently the subject of research and debate (Oates, 2002) .
What degree of centralization is better suited for environmental objectives? The degree of decentralization that can be most effective in achieving specific environmental objectives, such as improved water quality and service provision, remains an unresolved issue. In particular, the impact of fiscal competition on social welfare remains a controversial issue.
Some of the advantages of decentralized environmental policies are based o n technical characteristics that are unique to each jurisdiction or region, while others rely on heterogeneity of tastes among j urisdictions' population. It is well-known, for example, that the per-household cost of treating drinking water varies among communities depending on the size and other characteristics of water distribution and sewerage systems. Likewise, there are significant differences regarding preferences for environmental protection. Some populations are willing to sacrifice some economic growth for a cleaner environment, while others prefer the opposite. So, in that context, subcentral governments are more likely to choose efficient policies for water resources.
From the opposite perspective, it is possible that some subcentral governments would fail to choose efficient policies in the absence of central regulation.
Centralization might be preferred if one jurisdiction's environmental policies generate unchecked externalities on other jurisdictions or maybe on future generations.
Moreover, centralized environmental policies could guarantee a minimum protection for all population.
In this research, we analyze the c onsequences of different levels of centralization, in the context of water resources in Spain. We will see that those resources have not been shared out in a homogeneous way, and there have been strong differences in consumption across regions and periods. At times, some regional deficits have had to be covered with other regions´ resources; thus, the potencial overuse in some regions can lead to consequences in other jurisdictions. The main objective of the paper is to evaluate what level of government might manage water resources in the most efficient way. This naturally is at the core of the current debate of what is the optimal level of centralization for the management of natural resources.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we review the main contributions in the field of environmental federalism. Next, we propose a simple model to evaluate the performance of different levels of government centralization. The theoretical model captures the impact on the regions´ welfare of several features, such as preferences or the way by which private consumption deteriorate water resources. The empirical application uses panel data for Spanish regions in the period 1996-2001, to identify a water pressure-consumption transformation function. The most recent wave of the World Value Survey (1999) (2000) (2001) have allowed us to get information about Spanish population's preferences between environment and economic grown. Based on the main parameter of the model calculated previously, a simulation exercise has been implemented. Finally, we conclude with some thoughts and suggestions for further research.
-Decentralization and environment: a brief review
The advantages and disadvantages associated with decentralization have been long debated in the literature. It has been argued that if there is heterogeneity among jurisdictions, centralization is suboptimal (Peltzman and Tideman, 1972; Oates and Schwab, 1996) . This is because strong differences in preferences among governments could lead to important efficiency losses for small-size jurisdictions (Burtraw and Porter, 1991; Dinan et al., 1999) . In such cases, decentralization is a preferable alternative in order to take into account local circumstances. On the other hand, decentralization could result in a severe reduction of environmental quality, as a consequence of 'destructive interjurisdictional competition' (Cumberland, 1979 (Cumberland, , 1981 .
The so-called 'race to the bottom' could lead to excessively lax environmental standards.
With respect to environmental policy overall, the literature is not overwhelmingly in one side or the other of the decentralization issue. Some studies have stressed the advantages of decentralization, because fiscal competition does not result in excessive pollution, and it can make possible efficiency improvements (Oates and Schwab, 1988; 1996) . List and Mason (2001) , develop a model based on game theory in a context of asymmetric information and strategic behaviors. They conclude that decentralization can dominate centralization w hen there are significant differences among jurisdictions and initial pollution conditions are not very high.
We must note that t he conclusions of some of those studies are excessively dependent upon stringent assumptions, involving technological characteristics, the size of jurisdictions, the existence of strategic behavior among jurisdictions or the objectives of local governments 1 . If some of those initial assumptions are relaxed, it is possible to find a series of papers, which have concluded that competition among jurisdictions can lead to welfare losses. Those include models which assume that local governments cannot use all kind of fiscal instruments to implement environmental policies (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986; Wildasin, 1989) . These studies show that, in decentralized settings public goods will be underprovided bellow optimum levels, and that decentralization may result in excessively lax environmental standards.
More recently, Markusen et al. (1993 Markusen et al. ( , 1995 show that regional governments establish their taxes in order to attract foreign plants. In such context, the regions are looking for getting economics rents that would otherwise be earned elsewhere, and by competing, the regions decrease their ability to exploit rents and to regulate efficiently the levels of pollution. Levinson (1997) attempts to conciliate both kinds of models in a theoretical framework. He concludes that t he consequences of decentralization on efficiency depend on monopoly profits and tax exporting, not the nature of the pollution externality or environmental federalism.
Finally, Fredriksson and Gaston (2000) f ind that centralized and decentralized governments could have similar effects. They show, for example, that sometimes, environmental standards are independent of institutional design. They also find that decentralized policies are efficient as long as either or neither lobby groups are organized.
The presence o f externalities is an argument that leads to justify central government intervention, or in general more centralized institutional frameworks. It has been argued that if the environmental policy of one jurisdiction affects others jurisdictions, it is desirable to allow central government to set (not necessarily uniform) standards (Oates, 2002) . Shapiro and Petchey (1997) show a bundle of conditions which characterize interjurisdictional cooperation as an efficient solution, without the need for centralized policies 2 .
2 Those conditions are the following: a) States have sufficient trust in one another's morality, b)
States are fully informed about the policy c hoices of their treaty partners and c) The benefits of cooperation are sufficiently high relative to the rewards of defection. As Braden et al. (1997) pointed out, these conditions are hard to find in real situations, but it is possible to conclude that the existence of interjurisdictional externalities is not sufficient condition for central government intervention in an environmental context.
From an empirical point of view, some studies have focused on analyzing the consequences of decentralization in an environmental context (Dinan et al., 1999; List and Gerking, 2000; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002; Millimet, 2003; Millimet and List, 2003; Fomby and Lin, 2003) . Most of these studies fail to find empirical evidence of the 'race to the bottom' effect. Hence these studies support a decentralization approach, because centralized policies can impose large welfare losses on some jurisdictions 3 .
Sometimes, and as it has been predicted by some theoretical models (Glazer 1999) , the opposite effect has been observed, the so-called 'race to the top' (Milllimet, 2003) . It is not possible to find the 'race to the bottom' phenomenon (Fredriksson, 2000) , but instead stringent regulations (Glazer, 1999) . Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) find that decentralized governments set higher levels of abatement spending when neighboring jurisdictions establish more stringent rules, but there appears to be n o effect on a government's spending when the regulation is lax.
Summarizing, the majority of empirical contributions in this context have been focused on testing the "race to the bottom" phenomenon. However, although there are some theoretical s tudies which have analyzed the impact that different decentralization levels have on jurisdiction's welfare (Shapiro, 1996; Mueller and Oates, 1996) , we can
not find empirical studies which analyze this topic. We consider that this is an important issue, so, in the following sections we will develop an empirical example which helps to cover the scarcity of studies in this field.
-The theoretical model: comparing alternatives
In this section, we present a two-jurisdiction model, following Shapiro (1996) .Jurisdictions (regions) are denoted by the sub-index i, so i = 1, 2. In each region there are two kinds of citizens, capital owners, denoted by k, and "greens", citizens that value environmental quality, denoted by g. The type of individual is denoted by j, where j = k, g. So the population of each group in each state is denoted by n ij . We assume that the majority of population in region 1 is composed by capital owners, while in region 2 the majority of citizens has a higher preference for environmental conservation. The utility function of a representative citizen is the following:
Thus citizens' care for environmental preservation, Q, which is defined as an index of the natural resource's quality and availability, and c ij is defined f or the private consumption of the j-th individual in the i-th jurisdiction. We only consider one parameter, γ , to account for differences in preferences. Moreover, we know that g k γ γ > . In addition, we model the presence of externalities in consumption as:
This means that the more one jurisdiction consumes environmental quality, there could be less available for the second jurisdiction. If we think about water resources in several regions of a country, we can find that some regions consume more intensively than others and higher levels of economic activity can lead to an overuse and quality deterioration of water resources. This overuse and deterioration can generate water transfers from some regions to others, which can be costly from an economic point of view 4 .
Hence, the relationship between water pressure and private consumption needs to be modeled accurately by recognizing natural resource deterioration as an inevitable byproduct of the productive process. This process can be formalized through a transformation function as:
Where water resources quality and availability depends on regional total consumption, i C , and on a bundle of exogenous factors, denoted by i Z . As we will see, some parameters of that transformation function are significant in order to deciding which level of decentralization is preferred from a welfare point of view. From (2) and (3), we can find an explicit expression for Q:
Where c i is the per capita consumption in the i-th region. We can obtain the optimal solution for several scenarios 5 . Firstly, following Shapiro (1996) , we can consider a decentralized context (A), in which each region maximizes the utility of a representative citizen in (1) subject to the externality revealed in (4). In this context, we assume the rules of majority and anonymity. This means that subcentral governments take decisions based on majority preferences, and they do not know about individual preferences (governments are not able to distinguish between capital owners and "greens").
Next, we can look at two centralized scenarios, with a central government which maximizes total welfare, leading to the national sum of the marginal rates of substitution between water quality/availability and consumption equals the marginal cost of water quality/availability 6 (B1), or maximizing majority's welfare, (B2). Table 1 presents the optimal levels of private per capita consumption for each region in each one of these scenarios. 
Total country population is denoted by n = n 1 +n 2 ; (4) and (1), it is possible to obtain the optimal values of Q and U i . We can observe that, in order to decide the optimal level of decentralization, it is necessary t o find out how intense the relationship between consumption and environmental quality is. In the next section, we have estimated a transformation function for environmental quality-consumption, considering another factors which can have an influence on environment, such as the efforts of firms and public sector to protect the environment.
-Empirical application: the Spanish case
To estimate equation (4) Regarding the dependent variable, it is difficult to find some disaggregated index of water quality/availability. In this study, we use the inverse of per capita sewage water as the measurement of (Q). With this indicator, we are showing two features. On the one hand, it is a proxy of the level of pressure which is exerting on water resources, because there is a direct relationship between water consumption and sewage water. On the other hand, sewage water is quality deteriorated water by consumptive uses, so it could be interpreted as a proxy of water quality resources.
Two main independent variables are used: an index of economic activity in the region and a proxy for the firms' effort to improve water quality and availability. For the former, it has been considered the gross domestic product (GDP). For the latter, we have considered the one-period lagged capital expenditures on environmental protection, considering both public and private investments 7 (KEXP-1). The descriptive statistics of those variables are shown in Table 2 : In general, it is noticeable the negative relationship between economic activity and the index of water quality/pressure. Moreover, it is possible to see the positive and significant impact that private and public efforts have on water resources conservation.
Total capital expenditures in protecting environment have been a control variable which has allowed isolating the net effect of productive process on water quality.
From the previous results, it is possible to show a numerical example in order to
get an idea about utility levels under each scenario. To do that, we have considered information relative to an Autonomous Region located in the East of Spain, Valencia (Area 1) and three Autonomous Regions located in the North, Aragon, Navarra and La Rioja ( Area 2). This division is explained because those regions are the main jurisdictions included in the Jucar and Ebro River Basins. Area 1 has problems of water resources quality and availability, due to the strong environmental impact of tourism agricultural and industrial activities. The past administration national water plan called for a water transfer from Area 2 to Area 1. The data used in the simulations, which are based on estimates of the within-groups model in Table 3 , are the following: As we can observe in the previous table, the centralized efficient context dominates the remaining alternatives, due to the higher water quality and availability levels. However, i f we compare the decentralized context with a more realistic centralized context (B2), the final conclusion depends on the heterogeneity of preferences. A h igher gap between preferences' parameters k γ and g γ leads to chose decentralized alternatives. This fact is according with some theoretical and empirical findings 9 .
So under the hypothesis that incumbents search to satisfy minority and mayority social interests, or under majority maximization of homogenous preferences, the results favor some degree of centralization in the water resources field. Actually, s ome European Union environmental policies have been oriented in this way. Recently, the European Framework D2000/60/EC establishes a common guide for members to improve water quality and quantity aspects. The basic objective of t he European regulation is to improve water quality and to achieve a rational use of water resources, in order to reduce pressure on those resources. The UE is enforcing country members to apply this framework it in the following years. The Spanish central government will have to adapt its regulation to the European Framework. So, it is expected that this will re-centralize water resource management in Spain also and lead to improved social welfare in the UE regions.
-Conclusions
9 See section 2 for some references. We estimate a water quality-consumption transformation function, finding statistically significant coefficients and the expected signs. Our results suggest that economic activity has a negative impact in water quality and availability in Spain, while capital spending to conserve environmental quality is positively correlated with water quality and availability.
Finally, a simulation based on estimates has been shown, in order to guide the degree of decentralization of future public policies in the water field. Under some assumptions, centralized policies are shown to be superior, because they generate higher utility levels and upper water quality and a vailability than decentralized option. So, if the administrative costs of centralization were not very important and there is not very strong heterogeneity in preferences, centralized solution would be the best alternative from a welfare point of view. 
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